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In the course of the last decade it has become clear that events have
gone wrong in Saudi Arabia. A deep intra-societal struggle cuts
across all formative institutions of the country and the house of Al
Saud is at pains to address its profound crisis of legitimacy and per-
formance, the overwhelming crisis of identity associated with moder-
nity, the internal and external pressures for socio-economic reforms,
and the complex and multi-faceted phenomenon of religious extrem-
ism. This article examines the formidable challenge of addressing
frustrated popular expectations, and reforming the state’s religious
institutions and rigid politico-ideological agenda without alienating
the substantial conservative constituency on which the monarchy’s
legitimacy depends. It also traces the historical and the ideological
roots of international and local jihadism as well as the evolution of
Wahhabism from a retrograde but status quo-oriented philosophy
into a radical ideology prone to violence and terrorism.
INTRODUCTION
In the course of last decade it has become clear that events have gone
wrong in Saudi Arabia. A deep intra-societal struggle cuts across all formative
institutions of the country and the house of Al Saud is at pains to address its pro-
found crisis of legitimacy and performance, the overwhelming crisis of identity
associated with modernity, the internal and external pressures for socio-econom-
ic reforms, and the complex and multi-faceted phenomenon of religious extrem-
ism. There is a growing vacuum in religious authority, and the Saudi monarchy
is walking a tightrope in its effort to navigate between the forces of reform and
the conservative religious and cultural forces on which its legitimacy depends.
Saudi society remains deeply conservative and the house of Al Saud seems to
recognize the formidable challenge of addressing frustrated popular expectation,
and reforming the state’s religious institutions and its rigid politico-ideological
agenda without alienating the conservative constituency. How far and how fast
the monarchy can integrate concepts of dialogue, tolerance, and pluralism in a
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political reality built upon a narrow, rigid, and inflexible heritage is not clear.
The dramatic terrorist events in Saudi Arabia, reported divisions in the
royal family, and intensified turmoil in the region have spawned alarmist specu-
lations about the nation reaching the boiling point. The jihadists have proved
adept at manipulating slogans, mobilizing themes, and appropriating them for
their own revolutionary purposes. Through networks of schools, storefront
mosques, and other institutions they consolidated their ability to disseminate
their ideas and operate in the kingdom. But contrary to popular images, the
jihadists have not been successful in garnering much popular support and they
stand little chance of destabilizing the monarchy within the next decade. The
bulk of the populace, particularly the religious establishment, are hostile to them,
fearing that their tactics will lead to fitnah, or chaos. Beyond that, however,
Saudi’s future is uncertain.  There is a real possibility that if socio-economic dis-
tress deepens and popular resentment of the house of Saud intensifies radical
groups might emerge as an independent political force.
A CULTURE UNDER FIRE
The kingdom’s domestic and international troubles are largely of its own
making. It was the state’s support for the ideological and motivational sources of
Islamic radicalism that laid the groundwork for the surge of modern global ter-
rorism. The state provided the radicals with overall political and strategic guid-
ance, equipment, and training for their activities. The Saudis funded mosques,
Islamic study centers, universities across the globe, and madrassas to propagate
their own rigid and intolerant version of Islam. To preserve its enormous privi-
leges and perpetuate its hold on power the monarchy bought off its ardent critics
at home, gratifying their wishes and financing their proselytizing missions
abroad. Those that refused the generous offers were crushed, marginalized, or
shipped overseas. This policy of repression and cooptation was entrenched after
the dangerous challenges of the late 1970’s. Afraid of suffering the same fate as
the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran, the royal family empowered the religious estab-
lishment, granting it further financial incentives, significant concessions in social
and religious matters, and a mandate to propagate Wahhabi ideology abroad.
Excessive powers were given to the mutawaun (volunteers), the agents of the
Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, whose main
job is to patrol the streets and public settings to ensure compliance with Wahhabi
prescriptions. Violators of the dress code and gender segregation rules were
taken into custody as were those who did not close their shops during prayer
times.  
This new era in Saudi life was marked by more stringent social measures
where the Wahhabi clerics enjoyed censorship power over the media. They suc-
cessfully lobbied for more religious education in the schools and universities,
and effectively barred women from TV, prohibited music in any media, and mar-
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ginalized Shiites and other minorities. Some of the Muslim institution’s Saudi oil
money was used for material and ideological support for jihadists. This develop-
ment was the unintended result of lax oversight by the kingdom. 
After the horrific events of 11 September 2001, when 15 out of the 19
hijackers were Saudis, Saudi Arabia came into the spotlight. In the United States,
a torrent of articles, books, television shows, documentaries, and congressional
speeches vilified the kingdom’s religious beliefs, social mores, cultural tradi-
tions, and every other conceivable aspect of Saudi life to the point that some
commentators wondered why Saudi Arabia was not included in George Bush’s
“axis of evil.”1 Stephen Schwartz, a new adherent to Sufism and a vociferous
critic of Wahhabism, made Saudi Arabia the incarnation of evil.2 “Claiming that
his study ‘constitutes a secret history comparable to the hidden archival record
of Soviet Communism,’ Schwartz manages to find the fingerprints of Riyadh at
crime scenes that no Saudi ever visited,” wrote Princeton professor Michael
Doran.3 A number of self-proclaimed experts claim that there lies the source of
Islamic terrorism, and then laments the US reluctance to go after Wahhabism and
its Saudi sponsors, for in their view crushing Wahhabism would probably rid the
world of jihadism. Some do so without engaging in a critical analysis of the poli-
cies and beliefs of Saudi Arabia, while others base their conclusions on
“unsourced or suspect data.”4 Critics like Stephen Schwartz have “provided
activists with a valuable prop: a text to clutch when they stand before the micro-
phone and exclaim, ‘I have in my hands proof of Saudi evildoing’.”5 Schwartz’s
testimonies before Congress, like those of Dore Gold, former Israeli representa-
tive to the United Nations, and others, became authoritative references to law-
makers. In a Washington Post opinion piece, Senators Kyl and Schumer deliv-
ered a strong indictment of Wahhabism and the House of Al Saud on the sole
basis of what they heard in congressional hearings.6
There is no question that criticism of, and concern about, the monarchy’s
funding and ideological legitimation of Sunni Muslim extremism is absolutely
legitimate but some uninformed and dubious claims about the kingdom were
over the top. It is not helpful when in a briefing to the Pentagon’s Defense Policy
Advisory Board, former RAND Corporation senior analyst, Laurent Murawiec,
described the Saudi regime as “the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dan-
gerous opponent” of the United States in the Middle East and recommended that
the United States seize Saudi oil fields and freeze its assets.7 In Washington and
elsewhere in the United States it became fashionable to defile anything that is
Saudi. “To say anything kind about Saudi Arabia is to invite a reprimand. To say
anything unkind about it is to win points,” noted Chas Freeman, the US
Ambassador in Riyadh from 1989 to 1992.8 Cognizant of how a majority of
Americans have become deeply suspicious and even derisive of Saudi Arabia,9
then-presidential candidate John Kerry used every opportunity to score political
points against his opponent, President Bush whom he depicted as unable and
unwilling to stand up to the Saudi regime.  
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It is important to recognize that, though puritanical, contemptuous of
modernity, and amenable to producing terrorists like bin Laden, Wahhabism is
not terroristic in and of itself. Depicting Wahhabism alone as the godfather of the
new global terrorism is false and does not help much in tracing the deep roots of
bin Ladenism. Calling Hezbollah and the Taliban “Wahhabized fringe groups,”
as Schwartz does, is wrong. Hezbollah is a Shiite movement, and the Taliban is
affiliated with the Deobandi sect. Wahhabism is one form of Salafi interpretation
and there are many Salafi movements in the Islamic world with few ties to
Wahhabism. As Anthony Cordesman put it, “Blaming Saudi beliefs, or
Wahhabism, for the views and actions of most of today’s Salafi extremists is a
little like blaming Calvin for today’s Christian extremists or Elijah for today’s
Jewish extremists.”10 There is a subtler picture than the belief that where
Wahhabism is the official creed there must be a terrorist state. The ideational and
ideological underpinnings of modern global terrorism, best exemplified by bin
Laden, issue from a much more complicated set of intellectual, political, and ide-
ological trends than what Stephen Schwartz refers to as the “fatalistic Wahhabi
cult that resides in the heart of the Saudi establishment.”11
DEADLY FUSION: WAHHABI MILITANCY AND QUTB-STYLE
JIHADISM
The phenomenon of bin Ladenism can be traced back to a deadly mixture
of the early Saudi tradition of aggressive Wahhabi militancy and the movement
of political Islam which had emerged in Egypt in the late 1920s and was trans-
formed into a revolutionary political trend by Egyptian scholar, Sayid Qutb. The
deadly fusion of Wahhabism and Qutb-style jihadism started in the 1950s and
1960s when Saudi Arabia became home to elements of the radical Muslim
Brotherhood of Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Syria. Seeking to shore up its Islamic
credentials, the Saudi monarchy championed Islamic causes worldwide without
seeming to appreciate that such a stance risked diluting its monopoly on Islamic
interpretation. Far too often, the Saudis paid little attention to the radical brand
of Islam advanced by legions of teachers coming from Egypt. Fleeing political
persecution at home, Muslim Brotherhood members found refuge in the Saudi
educational system and large Saudi charities, like the Muslim World League,
where they built strength, laying the groundwork for the development of a new
hybrid, best exemplified by Muhammad Qutb. He fled to Saudi Arabia and along
with Abdullah Azzam, one of the heads of the Muslim Brotherhood from Jordan,
taught at King Abdul Aziz University in Jiddah, where Osama bin Laden was
their student at the time. For regional geopolitical reasons, Saudi Arabia wel-
comed theses Islamic scholars to foster religious education and help offset the
ideological assaults of Arab nationalism, communism, socialism, and leftism.12
Islam has always constituted the sole bedrock of Saudi legitimacy.
Whenever challenges emerged that threatened that legitimacy, the monarchy was
quick to counteract them by advocating pan-Islamism. The Saudis depicted Arab
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nationalism as the great enemy of Islam. In the late 1970s, however, the chal-
lenge to Saudi Islamic credibility was of a different kind to that posed by
Baa’thist and Nasserist Arab nationalism, and once again the Saudi monarchy
reacted, perhaps unwittingly, by accelerating radical religious and Islamic awak-
ening. Saudi policies helped spur a boom in a new generation of sheikhs, pro-
fessors, and students influenced by Egyptian Muslim Brothers, ideology to
counter the menace of shiism coming from neighboring Iran where the Islamic
revolution posed a direct challenge to the house of Al Saud. Ayatollah Khomeini
challenged the Islamic credentials of the Saudi monarchy, accusing it of being an
agent for the enemies of Islam and stirring the Shiite minority to rebel against the
regime. The most shocking challenge to the house of Al Saud’s Islamic legiti-
macy came with the armed seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979 by a group led
by Juhayman bin Saif al-Utaibi. As has been the case since the founding of the
modern Saudi state in 1932, the regime has rebuffed threats to its stability by
proving itself to be more Islamic than its detractors, but in the process it helped
produce, though unintentionally, a radical, non-official, Saudi Islam even while
making efforts to suppress it. 
A NEW MENTALITY OF JIHAD: THE RISE OF QAEDISM 
This marriage between the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and Wahhabi
doctrine, better known as Salafist, entered a new stage with the jihad against the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when the regime sought to deflect its
homegrown militants from domestic agitation by sending them off to fight the
Soviets. It is there that Osama bin Laden became well versed with the Qutbist
and Mawdudist ideology that would transform the concept of jihad in the mod-
ern world. In Afghanistan bin Laden and other Saudi mujahidin fought alongside
jihadists inspired by the ideologies of Maududi, Qutb, and their intellectual heirs,
Palestinian scholar, Abdullah Azzam, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the blind
sheikh, Omar Abdul Rahman. Abdullah Azzam, dubbed the “gatekeeper of the
Jihad” and the “Emir of Jihad” had a PhD in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and
was credited with being a masterful guerrilla organizer.13 He recruited Arab
mujahidin and built the international network that Osama bin Laden, the late
Mohammad Atef, and Ayman Zawahiri would turn into al-Qaeda. 
This joint venture between bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and other ideo-
logues from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement and Pakistan’s Jamiat-ul-
Jamaat-e-Islami created a “mentality of jihad” that had a profound impact on
Saudi mujahidin once the fighting was over and it was time to go back to Saudi
Arabia. Some veterans got on with their lives, but others returned home brain-
washed by a militaristic ideology steeped in an international jihadist culture that
is hostile to Western-influenced Arab governments. Unlike their Egyptian and
Syrian counterparts who had their religious or political awakening grafted from
inside their countries long before they landed in Afghanistan, most Saudi veter-
ans had their formative years in Afghanistan where their political, social, and
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religious views were molded. These foreign-born views stood in sharp contrast
to the ones promoted by the retrograde but non-political Wahhabi religious
school. 
THE GULF WAR: THE CATALYST OF SAUDI RADICALISM
The 1990-91 Gulf War, which brought American and other Coalition troops
to stand guard over Islam’s holiest sites, was a cataclysmic event for a number of
Saudis who were shocked by the kingdom’s inability to protect itself after having
spent billions of dollars on arms. The Jihad Movement epitomized by the Afghan
veterans and “the Islamic Awakening” (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya) faction led by
Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali saw the presence of American troops in
Saudi Arabia as sacrilegious and part of a pernicious Western design to control
Arab and Muslim lands.14 For both groups the Gulf War laid bare the incompe-
tence of a corrupt regime that was subservient to the United States. But while the
Afghan veterans called for armed struggle against the monarchy and its security
forces, the al-Sahwa leaders never openly advocated the overthrow of the Saudi
regime, nor were they linked to such terrorist actions as the bombing of the
National Guard facilities in Riyadh in 1995, or the more deadly attack in Dhahran,
better known as Khobar Towers, the following year. Their main goal was to per-
suade Saudi leaders to repent, and rectify its corrupt and worldly policies in line
with pure Islam. To accomplish their task they skillfully used their writings, ser-
mons, and cassette tapes to mobilize and expand their base and pressure the
regime to engage in a frank debate about the dire state of the kingdom.
In an unprecedented move in Saudi history the two sheikhs al-Awdah and
al-Hawali played a major role in formulating a 12-point “Letter of Demands”
that was signed by hundreds of prominent religious scholars, judges, and intel-
lectuals and was presented to the king in April 1991 through the late Sheikh
Abdul Aziz Bin Baz, the kingdom’s grand mufti. Contrary to the established
norm in the kingdom, where all criticism of the monarchy should remain private,
the letter was made public, and as a result many of the signatories of the letter
were questioned and threatened while others landed in jail. This extraordinary
manifesto of radical change called for a broad reform program, including the
reform of religious institutions, the formation of a consultative council, the cre-
ation of an independent judiciary, and the enforcement of accountability rules for
all officials. In July 1992, the al-Sahwa leaders and 107 of their followers draft-
ed an even bolder and comprehensive 46-page “Memorandum of Advice.”
Unbowed by the regime’s threats and the consequences of their defiant act, the
petitioners called for freedom of expression for independent clerics, right of
access to official radio and television to preach their views, an overhaul of
domestic and foreign policy, the eradication of corruption, an end to abuse by
authorities, and the application of real Islamic law. The official clerical estab-
lishment and the national media were quick to denounce the memorandum and
those who refused to do so were dismissed. 
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As was always the case, the regime relied heavily on its tested approach of
repressing, dividing, and co-opting its enemies. But dire economic conditions,
widespread public anger over the presence of US troops in the country, and the
regime’s inability to deal with outside threats made the challenge of the 1990s
different. The non-official clergy appeared to be gaining ground and confidence
at the expense of the official clergy. The state-appointed clergy and their non-
official counterpart had often been in conflict, denouncing each other and con-
stantly seeking to increase their influence with the public. But in the wake of the
Gulf War the alternative clergy gained new momentum and credibility due to
their articulateness and ability to take advantage of the monarchy’s crisis of legit-
imacy and incompetence.  They issued fatwas that drew wider public support and
discredited the ones written by state-appointed clerics. The latter lost their
authority and standing due to the widespread perception that they were syco-
phants to a corrupt, arbitrary, and heavy-handed regime. 
The Gulf War was indeed a catalyst for radical Islamic anger and politi-
cization. The Islamists became more organized than ever before, and their
demands became bolder and more far-reaching.15 King Fahd’s hesitant, concil-
iatory gestures did not help quell the mounting challenge to the regime. The for-
mation of an appointed non-legislative consultative council and the delegation of
more power to provincial governments only intensified the Islamists’ drive for
radical change. In May 1993, a small group of academics, lawyers, and clerics
founded the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) to enhance
peaceful reform, human rights, and defend the rights prescribed by the Shari’a.
The regime lashed out against this movement, using senior establishment reli-
gious figures to undermine the group’s claims and substantiate the monarchy’s
stance that the kingdom’s rule was based on the rights prescribed by the Shari’a.
CDLR’s founding members were harassed, laid off, or imprisoned.  Hundreds of
their supporters suffered the same fate. Sheikhs al-Awda and al-Hawali did not
escape the wrath of the regime and in September 1994 they were jailed. The
detention of these popular and influential preachers was not without risk and as
was feared it triggered large demonstrations, especially in Burayda, al-Awda’s
home city in Qassim province.16
The government crackdown continued unabated. The authorities targeted
dissenting forces, utilizing a policy of divide and rule along with inducements to
groups willing to repent and cooperate.  This assault on rebel religionists, cou-
pled with selective harassment of political opponents, became the order of the
day, creating further political instability and a huge potential for mischief. The
attacks on Sahwa leaders pushed radical freelance sheikhs and their terrorist net-
works underground and to develop operational links with the jihadists’ move-
ment, gain new recruits, and launch a campaign of terror to destabilize the
regime. With all the major sahwist leaders behind bars or in exile in Great
Britain, the debate over the politics of compromise shifted dramatically toward
the extreme fringe. By the mid 1990s, the radicals seemed poised to impose their
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militaristic platform and revolutionary, takfiri ideology. A number of Sahwa
leaders and followers joined the trend of Salafist Jihad though many others did
not. 
JIHADISM’S CROSSROADS: DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL
AGENDAS
The new converts to the jihadists’ ideology joined the battle set by Osama
bin Laden. Many went to Afghanistan, the Balkans, Central Asia, and Chechnya
to join a jihadi contingent recruited by al-Qaeda-aligned operatives in Jordan,
Syria, Egypt, and other countries in the Middle East and beyond. In these battle-
ground territories Saudi veterans of the Afghan war perfected the skills they had
developed at the expense of the Soviets, while new recruits underwent training
courses in jihad and were indoctrinated for martyrdom. The new Saudi
mujahidin acquired combat experience, and the ideological tools to fight the
apostate Saudi regime and its official scholar backers once back in the country.
While in voluntary exile, other Saudi jihadists sympathetic to al-Qaeda remained
at home devising their own set of goals that linked broadly with the supreme mil-
itary and political goal of the wider multinational network of jihadists. As a
homegrown terror network, they drew inspiration from the global ideology of
hatred, and that is where the connection probably ends between international and
local jihadists. The latter’s support comes mainly from a variety of local sources
brainwashed by the ideology of militant Islam and/or disenchanted with the
regime’s failure to deliver economic opportunity or political freedom.
This domestic-based terror network, known as al-Qaeda on the Arabian
Peninsula (QAP), is less cohesive in membership, consisting of cells of terrorists
and operating with subtle, decentralized links to groups that provide funding,
publicity, shelter, and recruiting facilities. Its loose structure means that it does
not use a single method of operating issued from a central command authority.
Bin Laden is perceived as a symbol of defiance, ideological inspiration, and pol-
icy guidance, inspiring attacks rather than plotting them. His emirs in Saudi
Arabia are top Afghan veterans and are the ones who outline objectives and
major strategy issues. They approve fatwas, organize religious affairs, authorize
major terrorist operations, and manage publicity and media strategy.17
Their effective management of the media is one of QAP’s key survival
tools. Internet technologies such as web mail, instant messenger, email lists, and
message boards are skillfully used to spread their propaganda campaign, advance
the group’s training and operational purposes, and produce the maximum psy-
chological effect. They also use these technologies to recruit followers, raise
funds, and engage in psychological warfare tactics. This sophisticated use of the
Internet to carry messages, plan attacks, project a false view of events, and
launch a campaign of fear through intimidation, propaganda, and psychological
warfare has made it difficult for Saudi authorities and its Western allies to defeat
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a versatile enemy that masters the art of deception and electronic warfare.  
Despite the arrest of high-profile QAP operatives, the organization contin-
ually puts out two fortnightly magazines, which run from 30 to 50 pages each.
Sawt al-Jihad (the Voice of Jihad) is devoted to political and ideological matters.
Its primary goal is to cement the ideological basis of jihad, promote theological
justifications for martyrdom, and boost fighters’ morale.  The second online mag-
azine, Mu’askar al-Battar (‘Al-Battar Training Camp), covers military training.
With the US robbing al-Qaeda of their training facilities, the need arose for the
terrorists to find a substitute for this loss. Although new training centers were set
in several places, including Saudi Arabia and Iraq, they could never replace the
vast safe havens destroyed in Afghanistan. QAP had to find other practical ven-
ues capable of absorbing and training the growing number of its recruits. It is in
this context that the architects behind QAP explored the Internet as a means to
expanding their training operations and launched the monthly magazine, Al
Battar. 
In page after page the reader is introduced to the art of guerrilla warfare
and survival tactics, the skills of kidnapping, negotiating, and taping executions,
the importance of maintaining operational security, and the value of sports, just
to name a few.18 The regimen of terror lessons is comprehensive. Senior mem-
bers of al-Qaeda also contribute to the magazine, the most prominent of which
was the Egyptian, Saif al-Adel, the security chief for Osama bin Laden.
QAP also launched a new magazine publication on the Internet aimed
exclusively at women, advising them on how to reconcile the apparent contra-
diction of fighting jihad while maintaining family life, how to support their hus-
bands in their conflict with the authorities, and how to bring up their children in
the path of jihad. Named after a female Arab poet belonging to the early Islamic
era and published by the “Women’s Information Office in the Arabian
Peninsula,” the al-Khansaa magazine is the first of its kind to reach out to
women for terrorist operational support missions.19 The wife-mother is strongly
urged to be in top physical condition, “not overindulge in eating and drinking,”20
and to “ask personal permission neither from her husband nor from her guardian,
because she is obligated and none need to ask permission in order to carry out a
commandment that everyone must carry out.”21 This is a striking development
given the draconian constraints that most jihadists impose or want imposed on
women. But this change of heart is driven by cruel though pragmatic reasoning.
The effectiveness of female suicide bombers from the occupied territories in
Palestine to Chechnya has convinced male jihadists, who could care less about
women’s rights or equality with men, to elevate women’s status in the war
against what they perceive as the enemies of Islam.  
The shocking suicide operations conducted by the Palestinian Wafa Idris,
the first Palestinian woman to successfully penetrate Israeli defenses and blow
herself up killing scores of innocent Israelis in the process, or Reem Raiyshi, the
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first Palestinian mother of young children to become a suicide bomber, seemed
to impress male jihadists enough to engage in a debate about the proper role of
women in jihad.22 Proponents of an active role of women in jihad back their
stand with historical examples where women played a tremendous supportive
role in the cause of jihad. The stories of those legendary females who joined men
in battle in the early days of Islam and celebrated the sacrifices of their sons and
husbands for the sake of jihad are recounted endlessly and posted on several
extremists’ websites.  What is also novel in this approach is that the champions
of women’s rights to participate in jihad are no longer concentrated on oppor-
tunistic male extremists.  The articles and editorials in al-Khansa magazine are
seemingly written by women, though it is not clear if they actually are.
This new strategy of incorporating women into QAP ranks has the ultimate goal
of using a hitherto untapped asset as a vehicle for indoctrinating the coming gen-
eration into a jihadist mindset. Women can play a major role in altering the social
order of society and rebuilding it in conformity with revolutionary jihad. They
can contribute to the ideological training of their children, indoctrinating them
for martyrdom and takfiri thinking. By instilling takfiri indoctrination in children
at a younger stage, they can grow up to be “good” jihadis. 
QAP also markets training films detailing targets and tactics. Role-playing
and scenario type of assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, attack technique at
security posts, and small unit raids on various types of targets are shown in fair-
ly good quality produced films. The production of these films demonstrates the
sophisticated infrastructure put in place by the jihadists’ media production wing,
the Sahab Institute for Media Production. Despite the massive onslaught of the
authorities, this video production arm of al-Qaeda published a number of rela-
tively sophisticated videos from “Nineteen Martyrs” (the story of the 9/11
hijackers) to clips showing preparations for potential terrorist attacks and testi-
monials by militants reading their last wills, to live recordings of terrorist oper-
ations, like the ones carried out against the al-Muhaya housing compound in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 8 November 2003, in which 18 people were killed and
120 injured. Cutting, sharp editing, and the professional and time-consuming
process of producing and distributing lengthy video productions reflect the grow-
ing sophistication of al-Qaeda’s video production house.  
This deft use of the media accounts for QAP’s continued longevity, despite
the major setbacks and heavy losses inflicted upon it by the regime’s forces. That
the online magazines have not been interrupted by the death of QAP mastermind,
Sheikh Yousef al-Ayyiri, known also as al-Battar (“The Cutting Edge”), and
such other leaders as Abdel Aziz al Muqrin, once the nation’s most-wanted mil-
itant, Rakan Muhsin Mohammed Alsaykhan, Nasir Al-Rashid, and Faysal Al-
Dakhil, who worked closely and immediately under al-Muqrin, is a sign of the
resilience of the organization.  Eliminating the movement’s commanders has
proven to be less damaging than purging its most important ideologues. Military
commanders are much easier to replace than prominent theorizers who provide
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the ideological support necessary for recruitment, propaganda, and indoctrina-
tion. QAP realizes how crucial preserving its communications structures are to
its survival. Its online journals and printed pamphlets are the movement’s
Achilles Heel and they have been instrumental in safeguarding its ideological
core.
DILEMMAS OF CONSERVATISM
The Saudi regime’s obvious means of attack revolve around aggressive law
enforcement, deterrence, and antiterrorism operations. Many of those suspected
of being involved were arrested or killed in clashes with Saudi police and secu-
rity forces. But the continuous scope and audacity of terror networks in the king-
dom demonstrated that a campaign that relies solely on the police, intelligence
agencies, and other nonmilitary bureaucracies, while sparing QAP ideologues
and propagandists, was not enough to subjugate the enemy. “War means war,”
said Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s former ambassador to
Washington, in an unprecedented public statement. “It does not mean a boy scout
camp. War does not mean softness, but brutality . . . it is a war against terrorists
and aggressors, with whom there can be no compromise.”23 Critical of the way
the regime had conducted itself in the face of an existential threat, Bandar
warned against the dangers of indulging in a state of denial about the deep roots
of Saudi terrorism. “We should stop blaming others. What ails us lies within our
own ranks.  Enough of demagoguery and confusion at this critical stage in our
history.”24 Bandar urged a robust, unyielding, and comprehensive assault on the
jihadists accompanied by a reassessment of the identity of the enemy.  “If we
confront it with hesitancy, thinking of the deviants wishfully as misled young
Muslims, and that the solution is to call upon them to return to the path of right-
eousness, hoping they will come to their senses, then we will lose this war.”25
The prince’s message was clearly aimed at members of the monarchy who were
unwilling to confront religious zealotry, fearing that a crackdown on the main
indoctrinators of takfiri thinking would lead to widespread chaos.26
There are certainly differences of opinion within the monarchy about how
far the offensive on terror should go, and whether it should include members of
the clergy who, however uninvolved in violence they may be, still contribute and
fuel the propagation of radical ideas.27 Interior Minister, Prince Naif, and his
five brothers (Crown Prince Sultan, Riyadh Governor Prince Salman, business
leader Prince Abdul Rahman, Prince Ahmad, and Prince Turki) are suspected in
the United States of being involved in sponsoring the preachers of hate, export-
ing Wahhabism, and abetting the actions of terrorist organizations through their
network of charities. They are also notorious for forming a counterweight to their
half-brother, King Abdullah, and his desire for change. The “Sudayri Seven”
know that the regime must change in some way, and they are understandably
cautious that large-scale systemic reform might spin out of control and lead to
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the breakdown of the system, but so is the crown prince.28 Abdullah is not naive
to believe that full-scale democratization holds the key to the stability in the
kingdom or potential marginalization of the religious establishment serves the
regime’s interests. What he also seems to understand is that expanding political
participation, implementing economic reforms, and taking on the takfirists and
their way of thought without alienating the country’s substantial conservative
constituency are crucial to the monarchy’s survival.29
But herein lies the central paradox of change. Any democratizing of the
system entails openings to Sufis and Shiites, and this risks upsetting the delicate
balance between the regime, the religious establishment, the unofficial clerics,
and significant numbers of socially conservative people. What to do with women
and how to lift their status in society is another explosive issue that probably sur-
passes anything else in gravity. A number of conservative Saudis see attempts to
reform the status of women and minorities as driven by pernicious forces sup-
ported from the outside. The sensitivity and difficulty of tackling social issues
explains the hesitancy of even reform-minded princes to push as hard as they did
with purging the educational system of hate and discriminatory material. The
regime status as the promulgator, protector, and enforcer of conservative Islam
sharply limits its options for reforming the country’s socio-cultural system.  The
ruling princes have their own constituencies to report to, and, however ironic that
might be in a country known for its closed system and the arbitrariness of its
rulers, the House of Al Saud has to pay careful attention to the concerns of its
large religious base. It is within this context that King Abdullah’s dithering can
be understood.30
Abdullah understands the urgency of reforms, but he is mindful of the
regime’s religious base and the hardliners within the monarchy who are more
adverse to change. Prince Naif and his supporters seem to favor a militaristic
solution to the jihadist problem. They see political and social reforms as too risky
to implement at this stage of national mobilization as they might antagonize their
conservative power base and detract from the main priority of the regime -
defeating the terrorists. There is some truth to this viewpoint and its advocates
might feel vindicated by their relative successes on the battlefield and the sup-
port they drew from unofficial but popular religious critics. There is also some
truth to the fact that an opening of the system might most benefit the radical
Islamists. After all, there is considerable support for bin Laden’s ideas, though
not for his methods or designs, throughout the kingdom. Yet, while there is dis-
agreement on how far to go with change within the socio-cultural realm, there is
an emerging consensus among a wide spectrum of society, including the reli-
gious conservatives, on the necessity of moving quickly and aggressively to
reform governance issues. 
The last few years witnessed the emergence of a potentially transformative
force in Saudi Arabia. The rise of a broadly shared political consciousness
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between a number of progressive salafis, liberals, and Shiites was a novel and
striking development. This new trend of networking between previous enemies
gave birth to a unified political rhetoric, and demands for new structures of
authority and a new vision for the future development of the country.31 It also
gave a new potency to the movement for change by granting an unprecedented
opportunity for reformist intellectuals to reconstruct their image and transform
themselves into a popular movement. The moderate Sahwa leaders stood to ben-
efit from this alliance as well. Their embrace of liberals and Shiites was intend-
ed to show their moderation and willingness to search for common ground
through shared values, such as justice and peace. After the shocking terrorist
attacks against the kingdom, the Sahwa leaders strove to distance themselves
from the jihadists and prove that their Islam is one of wasatiyya (the middle
way). 
It is too early to say whether this coalition for change can stand together
and successfully paper over significant ideological differences. There is hope for
progress in areas that remain uncontroversial from a religious standpoint. The
liberals signaled their willingness to moderate their demands for social and reli-
gious reforms in exchange for the popular legitimacy their alliance with moder-
ate conservatives confer on them. “For sahwists, too, there would be potential
benefit, allowing them to resume political activism while moderating their image
— a goal very much on their minds since the 11 September attacks.”32 The
Shiites are keen on proving their loyalty to the country and the wise among them
know they have everything to gain from associating themselves with this emerg-
ing trend for change. 
The terrorist attacks promoted a sense of national unity and it would be
unwise of the monarchy to resist calls for cleaning its house. The absolute, cor-
rupt, and kinship-based system of governance has certainly run its course and
there is a growing frustration in Saudi society with the government’s indecision
and slow response to economic and social adversity. The regime’s contradictory
and ambivalent actions invite domestic and international doubt about its com-
mitments to change. There is widespread speculation about the inability of the
king or his reluctance to push forward and follow-through on the reform agenda
that he has embraced. Some of Abdullah’s critics claim that the king devised a
carefully staged policy of double-talk, aimed at appeasing domestic and interna-
tional critics. There is a growing concern that all the talk of reform was merely
rhetorical, designed to seize the initiative back from the US, which was deter-
mined more than ever before to push countries of the Middle East to reform their
economic, political, social, and educational systems. The Saudis were openly
troubled by this Middle East Partnership Initiative,33 as they were concerned
about dramatic developments in Iraq and beyond, feeling compelled to come up
with their own initiative to undercut American designs on the country.    
But no matter what the skeptics think about Abdullah’s intentions, the king
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and the moderates in the House of Al Saud recognize that some hard decisions
are needed to rescue the state.34 Abdullah’s attempt to embrace the people the
monarchy has long discriminated against is a step that shocked some Saudis in
the kingdom but reflected the new, inescapable reality that unless the regime
opens up gradually and cautiously, it risks further antagonizing a significant por-
tion of its constituency and possibly driving them a step closer to the jihadists.35
A few years ago it would have been inconceivable for the then-crown prince to
chair three national dialogues with secularists, Sufis, liberals, and, especially,
Shiites (whom most Saudis regard as heretics) to discuss their grievances, expec-
tations, and proposals.36 The fact that one entire dialogue dealt exclusively with
the “Rights and Duties of Women,” is a first in the Kingdom regardless of the
regime’s true intentions. The dialogue generated exceptional coverage of
women’s issues on television, radio, and newspapers across the country, an
achievement in and of itself.  For the first time in Saudi history, women and men
debated the thorniest of social issues: women driving, divorce laws, desegregat-
ed workplaces, and women’s unemployment. The recent hiring of a female as a
pilot is a meaningful step forward in what is to be a long, difficult road toward
the emancipation of women. “I see the hiring of this female pilot to work on
Kingdom Holding’s fleet of private jets as a historic move for Saudi ladies,”
Prince Alwaleed ibn Talal said in reference to the recruitment of Hanadi Zakariya
Hindi by his company.37
Notwithstanding their differences of view and approach, most if not all
senior members of the royalty, agree on the need to implement some reforms and
most of all eliminate zealous jihadists in the same fashion that the country’s
founder, King Abdul-Aziz, battled the zealous warrior Al-Ikhwan and crushed
their rebellion in 1929.38 Now, as then, the state has to enforce its will and break
the forces of extremism.  Battling Islamic militants has, of course, never been an
easy matter in a country where the religious establishment has considerable sway
over religious matters. The monarchy’s classic approach was to try to play its
favorite balance game with religious militants, accommodating them at times and
crushing them when they turned into deadly enemies.  The terrorist attacks that
rocked the kingdom proved the limits of that approach. Even Prince Naif and his
group came to recognize that the country has a major terrorism problem. The
question that remains unclear, however, is whether the regime is prepared to take
on the perpetrators of terror and those who inspire them, unlike any other time in
the kingdom’s history, or pursue the same self-defeating and ultimately self-
destructive policies of confronting the aggressors and appeasing the hidden
forces of extremism. Judging from the rhetoric of the senior princes, including
Naif, the tide seems to be tilting slightly toward fighting terror and the ideas
behind it.  The crackdown on intellectuals notorious for exercising takfir and pro-
viding the jihadists with ideological support was an encouraging start. The sus-
pension of over 1,000 clerics for “re-education” and the removal of objectionable




The monarchy understands that to lead effectively it needs to bring har-
mony and balance to the diverse voices and needs of the kingdom’s natural con-
stituencies. The majority of Saudis remain attached to conservative religious val-
ues and the Saudi regime realizes that any opening of the system entails margin-
alizing radical, violent forces without simultaneously alienating the broader con-
servative constituency. There is a general awareness of the role the religious
establishment can play as a veritable bulwark against jihadism and the forces
supporting it.  In times of crisis the country’s religious establishment rose to the
challenge and bolstered the regime’s response to radical threats to the kingdom’s
stability. Time and again, the regime was adept at rallying religious leaders and
its former Islamist critics to its cause.40 This was clearly noticeable after the hor-
rendous events of 11 September when the Saudi leadership successfully mobi-
lized religious critics of the regime to denounce religious extremism and under-
mine deviant understanding of Islam.  Sheik Salman al-Awda, al-Hawali, and
Sheikh ‘Ayd al-Qarni are good examples of three salafi dissidents and fiery crit-
ics of the regime who came together to add their voices to the chorus of disen-
chanted Saudis with bin Laden and his terrorist sympathizers.   
This resort to assistance from dozens of unofficial clerics in the conduct of
a campaign of ideological warfare against the evil scourge of terrorism stemmed
from the realization that only credible preachers with substantial popular follow-
ing can help get the job done. The regime knew full well that it was necessary to
reach out to Islamists known for their reactionary social views and open ani-
mosity to the liberal camp of Islamist progressives. In return for concessions on
social issues, the regime launched a massive public relations campaign targeting
jihadists, using official appearances by al-Hawali and al-Awda, and extensive
media interviews with dozens of alternate clerics to portray the jihadists groups
as outside the mainstream. In a dramatic appearance on television Sheikh ‘Ayd
al-Qarni got three jihadists (Nasir al-Fahd, Ali al-Khudair and Ahmad al-
Khalidi) to repent their deeds and renounce their radical fatwas inciting disobe-
dience and support for the Saudi militants.41 “Several of our fatwas (religious
edicts) and our declarations enacted hatred and contained other issues about
which we were deceived . . .. That is why I renounce several of these fatwas,”
said al-Fahd in an interview on state television.42 “Put down your weapons and
forsake your extreme and destructive ideas” declared al-Khalidi, a radical
extremist who said he had used his time in jail for soul-searching and was con-
vinced his old fatwas and ideology were wrong.43 Sheikh al-Khudair said the
militants carried out the explosions because of their ignorance of Islamic teach-
ings. “The life and property of non-Muslims in the Kingdom are under state pro-
tection and must not be attacked,” he added.44 All three extremists declared how
shocked by terrorism they were and how suicide bombers were not martyrs and
killing innocent people was not jihad.
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This dramatic renunciation of terror by leading figures in the radical camp
was hugely welcomed by different sections of the society as a blow to the tak-
firists who pronounced other Muslims as heretics or infidels. But it was the alter-
nate clerics who stood to gain from their assault on jihadists. In return for their
cooperation with the regime the house of Al Saud had to accommodate their
agenda of reforms sometimes at the expense of liberal thinkers or progressive
Islamists. Al-Hawali and other unofficial clerics have made no secret of their
contempt for the social reformers and have vociferously lobbied the monarchy
not to succumb to domestic and outside pressures for change that is incongruent
with their understanding of Shari’ a. But despite their hostility to social reforms,
the Sahwa position on other reform issues is not monolithic. There are a number
of Sahwa leaders who signaled their desire to join forces with a broad coalition
that includes Shiites and liberals. The January 2003 petition to Prince Abdullah
is a good example of Sunni Islamists, liberals, Shiites, and nationalists coming
together on a number of demands, most notably for more institutional constraints
on the power of the ruling family and more openness in government.45 The “con-
stitutional monarchy” petition of December 2003 is another good example where
Islamists, liberals, and Shiites came together to call for political reforms and
institutional constraints on the power of the house of Al Saud.46
CONCLUSION
This article has explored both the historical and the ideological roots of
international and local jihadism as well as the evolution of Wahhabism from a
retrograde but status quo-oriented philosophy into a radical ideology prone to
violence and terrorism.  Much has been said about Saudi Arabia’s faith, crisis of
confidence, legitimacy, and modernity but not much was written about its intel-
lectual impasse, existential dilemmas, and competing views over sacred author-
ity. Contemporary Saudi Arabia is grappling with fundamental issues of religion
and modernity, development and dependency, political oppression and cultural
turmoil, social frustration and institution building. There is a battle under way in
Saudi Arabia — a battle for social, political, and religious reforms. Whether the
country can come together to reconcile the principles of tradition with moderni-
ty is still difficult to tell but the failure to develop stable religious and political
institutions capable of dealing with the challenges of development and econom-
ic changes can be fatal.
Speculations about the collapse of the regime or potential rift within the
monarchy are unduly alarmist. On the battlefield the house of Al Saud has fared
well in its war against the jihadists, probably better than many want to give it
credit for. The conflict has served as a unifying force for the regime, allowing it
to create new bonds and associations with liberals, Islamists, modernizers, and
traditionalists, and reaffirm a shared interest in delegitimizing and defeating a
common enemy.  The mobilization of populist preachers and influential non-offi-
cial clerics to condemn jihadist acts and thinking coupled with the turning of the
Summer 2006
32
terrorists’ own ideologues against them was a clever survival strategy. The
regime has also proved adept at manipulating the power of images when they dis-
played gruesome pictures of victims of terrorist acts in television. This last tac-
tic was so successful that even top QAP operatives in the kingdom acknowledged
its powerful effects on Saudis.  More generally, the regime has taken initial steps
to curb extremist influence, for example, by purging textbooks of lessons incul-
cating hostility toward Christians and Jews and initiating poverty-reduction
plans. 
Like any other society under attack and heavy domestic and international
pressure to reform, the regime is at pains to advance social and political reforms
without undermining domestic stability. As it is engaged in a fight against a vio-
lent, radical Islamic movement that accuses it of deviation from the path of
Islam, the regime is loathe to threaten its relations with religious forces that both
oppose violence and enjoy popular legitimacy. The challenge, therefore, would
appear to be to marginalize the more radical, violent forces without simultane-
ously alienating the broader conservative constituency.
The road to reforms is fraught with dangers. The house of Al Saud has
waited so long to initiate the most basic of reforms that any path they take entails
risks. The rulers’ advanced age certainly complicates succession matters and they
must find it extremely difficult to break with their life long inertia and engage in
necessary but radical reforms. Bolstered by the current high oil prices and budg-
et surpluses, the regime might decide to pursue a ruthless offensive on jihadists
while clinging to the status quo in which it enjoys enormous privileges.
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